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Abstract
The aim of this article is to clarify how best to interpret some of the central constructs that underwrite the free-energy
principle (FEP) – and its corollary, active inference – in theoretical neuroscience and biology: namely, the role that gen-
erative models and variational densities play in this theory. We argue that these constructs have been systematically mis-
represented in the literature, because of the conflation between the FEP and active inference, on the one hand, and
distinct (albeit closely related) Bayesian formulations, centred on the brain – variously known as predictive processing,
predictive coding or the prediction error minimisation framework. More specifically, we examine two contrasting inter-
pretations of these models: a structural representationalist interpretation and an enactive interpretation. We argue that
the structural representationalist interpretation of generative and recognition models does not do justice to the role
that these constructs play in active inference under the FEP. We propose an enactive interpretation of active inference –
what might be called enactive inference. In active inference under the FEP, the generative and recognition models are best
cast as realising inference and control – the self-organising, belief-guided selection of action policies – and do not have
the properties ascribed by structural representationalists.
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1. Introduction
The aim of this article is to clarify how best to interpret
some of the central constructs that underwrite the free-
energy principle (FEP) – and its corollary, active infer-
ence – in theoretical neuroscience and biology: namely,
the role that generative models and recognition densi-
ties
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play in this theory, aiming to unify life and mind
(K. Friston, 2013; Kirchhoff, Parr, Palacios, Friston, &
Kiverstein, 2018; Ramstead, Badcock, & Friston, 2018).
We argue that these central constructs have been sys-
tematically misrepresented in the literature, because of
the conflation between active inference, on the one
hand, and distinct (albeit closely related) Bayesian for-
mulations, centred on the brain – variously known as
predictive processing (Clark, 2013, 2015; Metzinger &
Wiese, 2017), predictive coding (Rao & Ballard, 1999)
or the prediction error minimisation (PEM) framework
(Kiefer & Hohwy, 2018, 2019).
These latter approaches have much in common with
active inference, and together constitute what might be
called Bayesian cognitive science. The idea behind these
Bayesian approaches is, in a nutshell, that cognitive pro-
cesses are underwritten by predictions based on inferen-
tial models. Central among these models are generative
models – that is, statistical models of how sensory
observations are generated, which harness the prior
beliefs (i.e., probability densities) of a cognitive system
about its environment. In Bayesian cognitive science,
these generative models are said to work in tandem
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with recognition models– which harness posterior beliefs
that represent the system’s observationally informed
‘best guess’ about the causes of its sensations. Bayesian
schemes treat cognitive activity as inferring a posterior
probability distribution (a guess about the causes of
sensory states – the recognition density) via a process
of belief updating – essentially, changing prior beliefs
(from the generative model) into a posterior belief, by
assimilating new observations or sensory evidence.
The question that shall occupy us is how best to
understand the function and properties of the genera-
tive and recognition models in active inference under the
FEP, in light of the active processes involved in orches-
trating, maintaining and updating these models. In par-
ticular, we examine two contrasting interpretations of
these models: a structural representationalist interpreta-
tion and an enactive interpretation.
Recent work on the Bayesian approach casts genera-
tive models (and associated recognition densities) as
structural representations– that is, as ‘iconic representa-
tions in which the structure of internal representations
in the brain come to replicate the structure of the gen-
erative process by which sensory input impinges upon
it’ (Williams & Colling, 2017, p. 1962). The most enga-
ging recent defence of structural representationalism,
which will be our target, have been provided by Clark
(2015), G1adziejewski (2016), G1adziejewski and
Mi1kowski (2017), Hohwy (2014, 2016), Kiefer and
Hohwy (2018, 2019), Williams (2017) and Williams and
Colling (2017). On this view, cognitive processes are
seen as irreducibly involving internal, neural structures
that carry representational content, and which acquire
their contents via inferential processes in the hierarchi-
cal generative and recognition models that are instan-
tiated by the brain.
We argue that the structural representationalist
interpretation of generative and recognition models –
while providing an accurate description of these
constructs as they figure in some versions of Bayesian
cognitive science – does not do justice to the generative
models and recognition densities that figure in active
inference under the FEP. In contrast to these other
Bayesian theories, which are, in effect, theories of the
structure, function and dynamics of the brain, active
inference is a much broader theory of adaptive pheno-
types, that centres on the control of adaptive behaviour
and that emphasises the tight coupling and circular
causality between perception and action.
The enactive interpretation of active inference that
we pursue takes seriously the idea that active inference
is a self-organising process of action policy selection.
When understood as a self-organised policy selection,
active inference has the following non-trivial implica-
tion. Active inference is not merely a view of the brain
as reducing the uncertainty of its sensory observations
via perceptual inference. It concerns the active, selective
sampling of the world by an embodied agent. From a
technical point of view, active inference and perceptual
inference are not merely two sides of the same coin.
Instead, active inference is the name of the formulation
for policy selection. What advocates of the Bayesian
brain call ‘perceptual inference’ is just one moment of
the policy selection process in active inference under the
FEP, namely, state estimation. The issue we want to
press here is that the active inference framework implies
that perception is a form of action, that is, action and
perception cannot be pulled apart as they sometimes
are in the Bayesian brain framework.
In this sense, the active inference scheme is enactive
(Thompson, 2010; Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1991),
in the enactive sense of being for action (Bruineberg &
Rietveld, 2014; Kirchhoff, 2018; Kirchhoff & Froese,
2017; Kirchhoff & Kiverstein, 2019; Ramstead et al.,
2018; Ramstead, Kirchhoff, Constant, & Friston,
2019). Our enactive interpretation of active inference –
what might be called enactive inference– follows what
has been called the pragmatic turn in cognitive science
(Engel, Friston, & Kragic, 2016). In cognitive science,
this is the move away from a view of cognition as the
rule-governed manipulation of internal (often sym-
bolic) representations, to a view of cognition as being
essentially action-oriented, and therefore premised on
the selection of adequate forms of situationally appro-
priate action.
We proceed differently from much of the literature
discussing this question, in that we base our interpreta-
tion of generative and recognition models directly on
the mathematical apparatus of active inference.
Namely, we examine the FEP and active inference as
applied to the selection of adaptive action policies – in
contrast to other approaches that focus on the Bayesian
brain and predictive coding, for example, Clark (2015)
and Hohwy (2014). In active inference under the FEP,
the generative and recognition models are best cast as
realising inference and control– the belief-guided selec-
tion of action policies – and do not have the properties
ascribed by structural representationalists. We thus pro-
vide a philosophical and information-theoretic justifica-
tion for an enactive view of generative models under
the FEP.
The argumentative structure of this article is as fol-
lows. In the first section, we present the generative and
recognition models, as they figure in Bayesian cognitive
science, and examine the claim that these inferential
models are structural representations. In the second
section, we present the FEP and active inference. In the
third section, we examine in some detail the generative
models and recognition densities that are featured in
active inference under the FEP, emphasising the circu-
lar causality between action and perception that is
implicit in these formulations. Finally, in the fourth
section, we present the argument for enactive inference:
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generative models are control systems, and they are not
structural representations.
2. Statistical models as representations
2.1. Generative models and recognition models in
Bayesian cognitive science
Bayesian cognitive science is an approach to the study
of cognitive systems that has gained much momentum
in the last few decades (Ballard, Hinton, & Sejnowski,
1983; K. J. Friston, 2010; Rao & Ballard, 1999). On
this approach, cognitive systems can be described as
instantiating a form of Bayesian inference. That is, their
physical properties and patterns of behaviour come to
match (or infer, in a statistical sense) those of their
embedding ecological niche (Bruineberg, Kiverstein, &
Rietveld, 2016; Kiefer, 2017). The various flavours of
Bayesian cognitive science – for example, the Bayesian
brain (Knill & Pouget, 2004), predictive coding (Rao &
Ballard, 1999) and active inference (K. J. Friston, 2010)
– furnish mathematical tools to model how organisms
engage with their worlds (Lee & Mumford, 2003;
Mumford, 1992).
This framework is broadly Bayesian because it rests
on the idea that, at some level of description, organisms
encode expectations or beliefs about their environment,
which guide their cognitive processes (Rao & Ballard,
1999). These beliefs have been formalised as Bayesian
posteriors and priors. Bayesian priors in this context
correspond to probability distributions that are para-
meterised or shaped by physical states, for example,
brain states and patterns of neural activity.
2
Bayes’ the-
orem tells us how to combine optimally what we know
about the probability of some unobserved state or
hypothesis s, prior to making any observation – that is,
Bayesian prior beliefs, which is denoted P(s)– with what
we know, given some data or sensory observation o–
that is, likelihoods, denoted P(ojs). Bayes’ theorem tells
us that the posterior probability of some event, given
some sensory data, is proportional to the product of
the prior and likelihood
P(sjo)= P(ojs)P(s)
P(o)
The Bayesian claim that will concern us can be stated
more specifically as follows: cognitive systems act as if
they are inferring the causes of their sensations, that is,
inferring the most probable event or hypothesis, given
the sensory observation.
This kind of anticipatory engagement evinces a role
for statistical models (i.e., probability densities), based
on which the relevant predictions can be made, and
adaptive actions can be selected. If the organism has
access to a model of what states are the most expected,
statistically speaking, then it can compare its current
state to this model, instead of trying to evaluate how
surprised it is relative to all its possible states. Indeed,
this evaluation, which involves computing the marginal
likelihood or evidence P(o), often turns out to be an
intractable problem (K. J. Friston, 2010; Kiefer &
Hohwy, 2018). Most Bayesian schemes in cognitive sci-
ence suggest that organismic dynamics can be described
as bounding surprise by ‘guessing’ (i.e., approximating)
how surprising their sensory states are, based on statis-
tical models of their predicted sensations – hence the
appeal to approximate Bayesian inference. These
schemes are based implicitly or explicitly on optimising
an evidence bound called variational free energy (K. J.
Friston, Parr, & de Vries, 2017). We now briefly
rehearse Bayesian inference to unpack these terms.
In Bayesian cognitive science, the generative model
(that comprises a likelihood and prior density) is said to
be inverted to give the recognition model (that constitutes
a posterior density). A generative model is a probabilis-
tic model, denoted P(o, s), of how sensory observations
are generated. It is a statistical mapping from hidden
causes s, which include external states of – or causes in –
the environment to sensory observations o. Technically,
the generative model is a joint probability distribution
or density over hidden causes and observations. We
work with generative models more easily when they are
expressed in a form amenable to Bayesian parameterisa-
tion, as the product of likelihood and a prior
P(o, s)=P(ojs)P(s)
The beliefs harnessed in the recognition and genera-
tive models need to be updated to allow for adaptive
cognitive processes. There are several ways to imple-
ment belief updating. In Bayesian approaches such as
predictive coding (Rao & Ballard, 1999) and active
inference (K. J. Friston, 2010), belief updating entails
the formation of posterior beliefs about the causes of
sensations, using approximate Bayesian inference.
Technically, these (Bayesian) beliefs are referred to as
approximate posteriors, variational densities or recogni-
tion densities. The recognition model is the inverse of a
likelihood model: it is a statistical mapping from obser-
vable consequences to hidden causes. This explains
why forming a posterior belief is often referred to as
model inversion, where
Q(s)’P(sjo)
In other words, the recognition model is an approxi-
mate posterior probability distribution or Bayesian
belief that constitutes the organism’s ‘best guess’ about
what is causing its sensory states (including the conse-
quences of its own actions). It is called a recognition
model because the model allows one to determine –
that is, to recognise – the most likely cause of a given
observation. In contemporary belief updating schemes,
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optimising beliefs involve minimising a quantity called
variational free energy
Q(s)= argminQF(Q) ) Q(s)’P(sjo)
F(Q)=EQ½lnQ(s) lnP(s, o)
=EQ½lnQ(s) lnP(sjo)  lnP(o)ø  lnP(o)
By construction, variational free energy
F(Q)ø  lnP(s) is an upper bound on negative log evi-
dence, which is also called self-information or surprise
in information theory. This means that any system that
avoids surprising exchanges with the world (i.e., sur-
prising sensory states) will look as if it is predicting,
tracking and minimising a quantity called variational
free energy, on average and over time. Variational free
energy quantifies the difference between what an
organism expects to encounter and what it observes,
where observations can be about exteroceptive, intero-
ceptive or proprioceptive causes of input. In this sense,
it can be thought of as some generalised prediction
error. On this view, all the processes involved in cogni-
tion, from perception to learning and action, minimise
the difference between expected sensory states (given
prior beliefs) and observations, which gives them the
look and feel of Bayesian inference.
This optimisation can proceed explicitly as in predic-
tive coding (Rao & Ballard, 1999), belief propagation
(Pearl, 1982) and (marginal) neuronal message passing
(Parr, Markovic, Kiebel, & Friston, 2019) – depending
upon the form of the general model and optimisation
scheme. Some schemes try to learn a mapping from
sensory inputs to the recognition density, assuming the
parameters of this implicit recognition model do not
change with time or context. This effectively converts
an inference problem into a learning problem – as seen
in earlier formulations like the Helmholtz machine
(Dayan, Hinton, Neal, & Zemel, 1995). The more gen-
eral theme – that underwrites approximate Bayesian
inference – is that we can convert a mathematically
intractable inference problem into an optimisation
problem by extremizing variational free energy (e.g., by
minimising prediction error). Once inference is cast as
optimisation, one can then associate the dynamics
of any sentient system (e.g., creatures like you and
me) as implementing inference, via optimisation
through a process known as gradient descent (K.
Friston, 2013).
2.2. Generative models as structural representations
In this section, we unpack the notion that generative
models are structural representations, which is the criti-
cal target of this article. We will focus on the most
recent, compelling and engaging defence of this claim,
provided by Kiefer and Hohwy (2018, 2019),
G1adziejewski and Mi1kowski (2017), and G1adziejewski
(2016).
Generally speaking, representations are explanatory
constructs that are posited in cognitive science to make
sense of the capacity of a cognitive system to engage in
intelligent action (Williams & Colling, 2017). In this lit-
erature, representations are defined as structures and
associated dynamics that are internal to an organism –
typically, states and processes of their nervous systems,
especially their brains. What makes these structures spe-
cial, and useful in explanation, is that they carry repre-
sentational content, by virtue of which the organism is
able to engage its ecological niche through adaptive
behaviour (Boone & Piccinini, 2016; Ramsey, 2007).
Representational content is what the representation is
about –‘that is, in virtue of what they represent what
they do, or get to be ‘‘about’’ what they are about’
(Kiefer & Hohwy, 2018, p. 2390).
An increasingly popular line of argument holds that
the relevant neural structures function as iconic or
structural representations that carry structural content.
More specifically, structural representations operate via
exploitable structural similarity (G1adziejewski, 2016;
G1adziejewski & Mi1kowski, 2017; Hohwy, 2014;
Kiefer & Hohwy, 2018, 2019). On this account, struc-
tural representations get their representational contents
(1) from their standing in a relation of structural simi-
larity to the target domain, in the sense that the second-
order structural features (e.g., statistical properties;
O’Brien & Opie, 2004) of the target domain are recapi-
tulated in, or mirrored by, those of the neural represen-
tation and (2) from being exploitable by the organism
or agent, in the sense that the information about the
target domain encoded in the neural states can be lever-
aged by the cognitive system to guide intelligent, adap-
tive behaviour. This exploitable similarity relation is
weaker than strict isomorphism, and goes beyond mere
resemblance in that it requires that the encoded second-
level structural resemblance in question must be cau-
sally relevant to the behavioural success of the organism
(G1adziejewski & Mi1kowski, 2017; Williams & Colling,
2017). Structural representations are also described (3)
as detachable, in the sense that they can be used by the
agent to perform cognitive tasks ‘offline’, and (4) as
affording representational error detection– in a manner
analogous to cartographic maps – which allows for
coupled adaptive action in the world. This last clause
specifies what is at stake in (1) and (2): representational
error, here, refers to the idea that the user of representa-
tion can ‘get it wrong’. The structural representation,
like the map, does not itself afford representational
error – its use by the system does.
Recent defences of structural representations in the-
oretical neuroscience have leveraged the resources of
the PEM framework to argue that the generative models
that figure in Bayesian approaches to cognitive science
are structural representations. That is, proponents of
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structural representations argue that generative models
function as structural representations with representa-
tional content. A great summary of this view reads that
predictive coding theory
postulates internal structures whose functioning inside a
cognitive system closely resembles the functioning of carto-
graphic maps. It might be said that on the proposed inter-
pretation of the theory, cognitive systems navigate their
actions through the use of a sort of causal–probabilistic
‘‘maps’’ of the world. These maps play the role of represen-
tations within the theory. Specifically, this map-like role is
played by the generative models. It is generative models that,
similarly to maps, constitute action-guiding, detachable,
structural representations that afford representational error
detection. (G1adziejewski, 2016, p. 569, emphasis added)
The claim, then, is that generative models are struc-
tural representations, which are implemented by the
exploitable structure and dynamics of neural networks
in the brain: ‘This generative model can be understood
as a sort of brain-implemented statistical or Bayesian
network . . . whose structure resembles the causal-
probabilistic structure of our system’s environment’
(G1adziejewski, 2016, p. 571). So, in summary, on this
reading, generative models are neural structures that
represent, stand in for, or act as proxies for states of
affairs outside the brain in virtue of an exploitable
structural similarity.
Kiefer and Hohwy (2018, 2019) examine the way
that the generative model and recognition model con-
structs have been used in some Bayesian cognitive sci-
ence. They focus on versions of Bayesian cognitive
science that leverage the variational formalism, namely
Bishop’s (2006) variational approach to machine learn-
ing. Summarising their view elegantly, they write:
as priors and likelihoods of hypotheses are mutually
adjusted in light of prediction error, a reliable channel of
information transmission is set up between neural popula-
tions encoding sensory input and higher-level representa-
tions – an approximate recognition model. In the other
direction, a reliable channel is also constructed from those
high level representations back down to the sensory input
layers – the generative model. Since sensory input drives a
signal up through the hierarchy, which reaches the highest
levels, and then those high-level representations send sig-
nals back down through the hierarchy to the lowest levels,
we can think of the overall network as learning a mapping
from sensory input, through high-level representations of
causes, back onto sensory input. (Kiefer & Hohwy, 2018,
p. 2405)
We believe this to be an articulate description of
non-enactive appeals to the Bayesian brain and varia-
tional Bayesian principles. The outstanding question
for us is whether this view of the generative model accu-
rately describes these constructs as they are used in
active inference under the FEP.
3. The active inference framework
3.1. Phenotypes and Markov blankets
Living systems are unique in nature, since among all
self-organising systems, they seem to maintain their
organisation when facing environmental perturbations.
Most self-organising systems dissipate the gradients
around which they emerge: a lightning bolt, for
instance, effectively destroys the gradient in electrical
charge that gave rise to it. Organisms, strikingly, not
only self-organise but manage to persist across time as
self-organising systems (Ramstead et al., 2018).
Heuristically, we can say that organisms expect to be in
their characteristic phenotypic states; surprising devia-
tions from these expectations must be avoided to main-
tain the system within viable (i.e., phenotypic) states.
The FEP leverages variational inference to describe the
dynamics within this space of states that can be cast in
terms of active inference and self-evidencing (K.
Friston, Mattout, & Kilner, 2011; K. J. Friston, 2010;
Hohwy, 2016).
Variational methods allow us to do more than
model brain dynamics. Recently, it has been argued
that they allow us to cast living systems and their phe-
notypes as statistical constructs, in the following sense
(K. J. Friston, 2010; Ramstead et al., 2018). The system
tends towards occupying those states on average and
over time – they are literally ‘attracted’ to these states,
in virtue of their flow that is necessary to counter the
dispersive effects of random fluctuations (i.e., to resist
entropic erosion). (Technically, the characteristic states
of an organism constitute a random dynamical attrac-
tor.) This means that phenotypic states are frequented
with a higher probability than others. It follows directly
from this observation that the probability density over
the space of possible states of an organism must have
low entropy or spread.
Active inference adds to the technical apparatus of
variational inference the consideration of Markov blan-
kets (K. Friston, 2013; Kirchhoff et al., 2018; Ramstead
et al., 2018). The Markov blanket formalism provides
an answer to the question: what counts as a system? A
Markov blanket is a set of states that ‘enshrouds’ or iso-
lates the system of interest in a statistical sense (see
Figure 1). The presence of a Markov blanket partitions
the whole system being studied (in our case, living sys-
tems engaging with their environmental niche) into
internal (or systemic) states and external (environmen-
tal) states. The blanket itself can be partitioned into
active and sensory states, which are defined as follows:
active states are not influenced by external states, and
sensory states are not influenced by internal states. The
characteristic set or phenotype is then the set of
expected or most probable states that constitute the sys-
tem of interest; namely, internal states and their
blanket.
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3.2. Surprise, entropy and variational free energy
The FEP rests on a connection between three quantities
in the context of Markov blankets: surprisal, entropy
and variational free energy. The quantity called surpri-
sal (or more simply, surprise) is quantity from informa-
tion theory, which is a function of sensory states of the
organism and measures the unexpectedness of a given
state, namely, the (negative log) probability of a given
sensory state being sampled. Under mild (ergodic)
assumptions, the time average of surprise is equivalent
to entropy (K. J. Friston, 2010). That is, assuming the
system in question has robust features that can be mea-
sured more than once (i.e., that it possesses a random
dynamical attractor), the average of surprise over time
is their entropy H=E½ lnP(o) (Ao, 2005, 2008;
Seifert, 2012). Entropy in this context is a measure of
the spread, dispersion or dissipation of systemic states;
low entropy means that the system will occupy a lim-
ited number of states, compared to all possible states it
could be in.
Crucially, the Markov blanket dynamics can be for-
mulated entirely in terms of a gradient descent on sur-
prise. Heuristically, this means that, so long as the
Markov blanket is in play, the system must move
necessarily towards the set of least surprising states – to
exactly balance the dispersive effects of random fluc-
tuations. Note that this means that the necessary condi-
tions on the existence of a system (i.e., a Markov
blanket) can be captured purely in terms of surprise.
Variational free energy gets into the game rather late
in active inference: as noted above, organisms cannot
measure the entropy of their states, nor how ‘surprising’
they are in any absolute sense – they are ‘just in’ a sur-
prising state or not. To ‘know if’ states were surprising,
they would need to evaluate an intractable number of
possible states of being. In other words, they would
need to evaluate all the possible states that they can be
in (which is a truly massive number of states, given how
many parts and configurations even a simple organism
can comprise), and how surprising their current state is
relative to all those possible states. This feat is, for the
most part, computationally intractable (for technical
details, see K. J. Friston, 2010) – it either cannot be
accomplished or cannot in a biologically realistic time-
frame by biologically plausible mechanisms. However,
we can interpret the gradient flows implied by the exis-
tence of a Markov blanket in terms of a gradient des-
cent on variational free energy, thereby equipping the
dynamics with an inferential interpretation (and associ-
ated information geometry) in terms of approximate
Bayesian inference. The key move behind this interpre-
tation rests on associating the internal states with beliefs
about external states, via the recognition density
Q(s)[Qs(s)
s= argminsF(Qs) ) Qs(s)’P(sjo)
In other words, we treat the internal states as para-
meterising beliefs about external states. This converts
approximate Bayesian inference into an optimisation
problem that is ‘solved’ by the dynamics of internal
states, given sensory states of the Markov blanket.
Heuristically, variational free energy is a measure of
surprise, that is often cast in terms of prediction error –
namely, the difference between what would be the case,
conditional on the organism’s ‘best guess’ about what
caused its sensory states, and what it does observe. The
concrete, material states and processes of an organism,
in a sense, embody this guess. Unlike surprise, which
only depends on states which the organism cannot
access directly (the state of its Markov blanket and the
state of the external world), the free energy is a func-
tion of the beliefs and expectations of an organism, that
is, a function of Bayesian beliefs encoded by internal
states.
3.3. Active inference: variational free energy and
inferential models
In short, given a Markov blanket partition, it is fairly
straightforward to show that internal states can be
interpreted as encoding Bayesian beliefs about external
states that cause its sensory states – and so play a cen-
tral role in the construction of free energy, which is
defined relative to these beliefs (K. Friston, 2013; K. J.
Friston, 2010). The causes of sensory states are hidden
from the internal states, ‘under’ or ‘behind’ the Markov
blanket, given that sensory and active states separate
Figure 1. The Markov blanket and active inference. A Markov
blanket is a set of states that isolates the internal states of a
system, s, from external or hidden states s, in a statistical sense
(for notational consistency, external states are italicised, while
internal states are in boldface). In graph theoretic terms, the
Markov blanket per se is defined as that set of nodes that
isolates internal nodes from the influence of external ones,
which means that external states can only affect internal states
indirectly, via their effects on blanket states (K. J. Friston, Parr, &
de Vries, 2017). The Markov blanket per se is made up of
sensory states, which are denoted by o, and active states,
denoted by a.
Source: Adapted from Ramstead, Constant, Badcock, and
Friston (2019).
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internal and external states from one another (in a sta-
tistical sense).
To minimise or bound free energy means that the
organism is optimising its expectations about (i.e., its
Bayesian beliefs over) things veiled ‘behind’ a Markov
blanket. When these expectations coincide with the
actual posterior probability over external states, the
variational free energy becomes equivalent to surprise.
When they do not, free energy acts as a proxy (an upper
bound) on surprise, in the sense that free energy will
always be greater than surprise (K. Friston, 2012). This
also makes free energy a bound on (negative) model
evidence, because surprise is negative model evidence in
Bayesian statistics.
The partitioning rule – based on the dependencies
induced by a Markov blanket – induces a simple form
of active inference (K. Friston et al., 2011; K. J. Friston,
Kilner, & Harrison, 2006), in virtue of minimising sur-
prise directly via a gradient flow (i.e., the flow towards
the least surprising states). This is a way of saying that
internal and active states are directly involved in main-
taining the integrity of systemic boundaries: namely,
the Markov blanket. Active inference, in its basic rendi-
tion, describes the tendency of dynamical systems –
such as cognitive systems – to implement a dynamics
that minimises (on average) their surprise, via percep-
tion and embodied activity in the world. Active infer-
ence captures the idea that this stipulative minimisation
is instantiated in a generative model and realised
through adaptive action (understood as the enactment
of policies that minimise expected free energy).
In active inference, tracking and minimisation of
expected free energy
3
is a strategy that living systems
may use in order to select adaptive actions. Regardless
of the metaphysical status of free energy, if an organism
embodies the belief that its actions minimise free energy,
and if it can select actions on its basis, then that quantity
has physically real effects– by virtue of its effects the
action-guiding beliefs of organisms (i.e., policies). The
expected free energy gives the organism the capacity to
test the viability of its beliefs, since it tracks discrepan-
cies between those beliefs and the way things turn out.
In short, it is the beliefs about expected free energy that
drives the selection of action policies. Organisms that
are equipped with generative models of the causes and
consequences of their action can exploit the free energy
construct and use it to their advantage. Organisms self-
organise to reap the benefits of variational free energy,
giving their behaviour appearing to resist the second law
of thermodynamics, according to which entropy must
always globally increase (or, more precisely, of appear-
ing to resist the fluctuation theorem that generalises the
second law to open systems in nonequilibrium steady
state).
An important distinction between active inference
and the Bayesian brain is implicit in the selection of
actions. This follows because this process of selection
rests upon posterior beliefs about policies: namely, how
to sample the environment to solicit observations. In
other words, something new has been brought to the
table – posterior beliefs about the external states and
actions upon those states. Defenders of structural repre-
sentational interpretations of the FEP, of course, do
also acknowledge the role of action in the scheme (see,
for example, Williams & Colling, 2017). However, as
we shall discuss below, their representational gloss on
the issue is not mandated by the mathematical frame-
work that underwrites the FEP.
4. A tale of two densities: the generative
model and recognition density under
the FEP
4.1. The generative model and generative process in
active inference
In this section, we provide the interpretation of genera-
tive models and recognition densities that is in play in
active inference. The idea behind active inference, its
Bayesian nature – and the reason it is considered a
form of inference – is that the dynamics of living sys-
tems can be described as implicitly realising approxi-
mate Bayesian (i.e., variational) inference through the
selection of adaptive action policies. Under the FEP,
living systems can be regarded as instantiating a statis-
tical (generative) model of their sensory exchanges with
the ecological niche by realising a dynamics that
bounds variational free energy.
Variational free energy, and its minimisation in
active inference, depends on two quantities to which the
living system has access: its sensory states (or observa-
tions), and the internal states ‘covered’ by its Markov
blanket. The organism can optimise these quantities by
leveraging two probability densities that it entails and
embodies, respectively. These are the generative model
and the recognition model. These two probability densi-
ties have a specific form and function under the FEP.
Under the FEP, generative models are not explicitly
encoded by physical states. That is, they are not encoded
by states of the brain. Rather, it is the adaptive beha-
viour of the system that implements or instantiates a
generative model. This is a crucial point that differenti-
ates active inference from non-enactive appeals to the
Bayesian brain. The generative model is enacted; in the
sense that adaptive behaviour brings forth the condi-
tional dependences captured by the generative model,
that is, keeping the organism within its phenotypic,
characteristic states.
The technical term used in the literature for this rea-
lisation of a generative model is ‘entailment’ (K.
Friston, 2012) – and refers to the fact that the statistical
model in question is a consequence of the adaptive
behaviour of the organism. Technically, the dynamics
(i.e., the action policy selection) of a system are said to
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entail a generative model when the system is organised
to actively instantiate (through active inference) a pair
of probability density functions.
4
These are the recogni-
tion model and the generative model per se. What this
means, heuristically, is that the internal states entertain
specific statistical relations to one another, such that
they can be described as realising the inversion of a gen-
erative model. A generic generative model for policy
selection is depicted in Figure 2 (as a Bayesian net-
work) and in Figure 3 (as a Forney-style factor graph).
4.2. Variational inference and recognition dynamics
under the FEP
Variational inference gets into the game because
approximating the statistical structure of the environ-
ment involves guesswork and a few mathematical
tricks, as it were. The organism does not have direct,
unmitigated access to the generative process that pro-
duces its sensory observations. The organism only has
access to the sensory states of its Markov blanket (i.e.,
to its sensory observations). In short, creating attrac-
tors in the joint space of ourselves and the environment
is essentially a game of inference that is necessarily a
game of probability and information as well.
Mathematically, in active inference, the recognition
density operates as an arbitrary probability density
function – over external (hidden) states – that is para-
meterised by the values of internal states. The recogni-
tion density itself is defined under the generative
model. That is, the value of internal states encodes
information that changes the form of the recognition
density (changes the ‘guess’). In active inference,
through the realisation of a free energy bounding
dynamics, the recognition density embodied by the
organism comes to approximate the sufficient statistics
of the generative process from whence the creature
emerged. The dynamics enacted in active inference is
therefore equivalent to variational inference, what one
might call a process of ‘embodied inference’ (Allen &
Friston, 2016; K. Friston, 2011; Gallagher & Allen,
2016). Since the internal states of the Markov blanket
are those states that constitute the system, we can think
of the extended phenotype of the organism as literally
embodying or encoding information that parameterises
a recognition density.
Posterior densities over external states are approxi-
mated by tuning the internal states of the Markov blan-
ket. The internal states encode the parameters of the
recognition density (in terms of its sufficient statistics),
Figure 2. A generative model in active inference, represented as a Bayesian network. Left panel: Specification of the generative
model. Technically, a generative model P(o, s,p) expresses the joint probability of sensory observations o and their causes s, p– where
s denotes hidden states and p denotes the policy selected. A policy is just a sequence of active states, from which the next action is
sampled. The model typically comprises a likelihood term (the probability of making a given observation, given causes) and prior
beliefs about the hidden causes. In this model, the likelihood is specified by a matrix A, which captures the probability associated with
a given outcome under every possible combination of causes. Cat denotes a categorical probability distribution. Empirical priors
(priors that depend on variables) relate to transitions between hidden states, which are encoded in the B matrix. Hidden states, in
turn, crucially include the actions of an organism, which are determined by policies. Prior preferences over outcomes are encoded in
the C matrix, and the uncertainty or ambiguity associated with outcomes given each state are encoded by the H matrix. The vector
D specifies the initial state. This generative model is constructed for policy selection; policies will be selected if they are more
probable a priori; that is, if they minimise expected free energy G. The model is used to perform Bayesian model inversion. This is
essentially the process of constructing a recognition density – an approximate posterior probability density that inverts generative
mapping from consequences to causes, allowing for recognition based on observations (i.e., inferring the causes of sensory
outcomes). Right panel: The generative model expressed as a Bayesian network. Such a network is a representation of the conditional
dependencies between the causes of sensory outcomes. Open circles denote random variables, which must be inferred (i.e., hidden
states and policies); filled circles denote observations. Squares denote known variables, such as the model parameters.
Source: From K. J. Friston, Parr, and de Vries (2017).
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which is the organism’s ‘best guess’ about what causes
its observations. These parameters are optimised with
respect to a variational bound on Bayesian model evi-
dence. This bound is the variational free energy. This
means that by tuning expectations about the cases of
sensory data to bound free energy, the organism is also
maximising evidence for a statistical model of its own
existence (K. J. Friston, 2010).
‘Entailment’, in this setting, is used to emphasise that
a generative model is necessary to define the recogni-
tion model but does not have sufficient statistics that
are physically realised. In other words, a generative
model is defined stipulatively as a probabilistic belief
that explains the realised recognition model (i.e., per-
ception and cognition) and subsequent action (i.e., pol-
icy selection and behaviour). See K. Friston (2012) for
a formal treatment of entailment. Thus, the generative
model is entailed by the internal dynamics, while the
internal states encode the recognition model, in terms
of sufficient statistics (e.g., expectations and precisions).
The ‘causal bite’ of the generative model comes from
the fact that it plays a role in policy selection by indu-
cing free energy gradients (which then guide changes to
beliefs about action). In other words, generative models
are normative models of ‘what ought to be the case,
given the kind of creature that I am’– they are realised
physically through adaptive, belief-guided, normative
actions that maintain the creature in its phenotypic
states.
In summary, in active inference under the FEP, the
generative model underwrites the selection of adaptive
action policies. We can think of active inference as a
story about how these two densities, the generative and
the recognition densities, interact and change, and are
leveraged by the organism to engage in adaptive beha-
viour – a tale of two densities, as it were. Our enactive
interpretation proposes that changes in the recognition
density, that is, alterations in the physical structure of
the embodied organism, are controlled by the genera-
tive model, which selects which action policies to pursue
on the basis of expected free energy. In this process of
attunement, organisms change their structure (through
learning and perception) and the structure of the world
(through action), such that they become consistent with
the preferences and expectations about the world that
constitute the generative model (Bruineberg et al.,
2016). In so doing, the generative and recognition mod-
els become attuned to the statistical structure of the
environment from whence they emerged (i.e., the gen-
erative process).
5. Enactive inference
In this section, we unpack the implications of the prag-
matist view for understanding the relations between the
generative model, the generative process and the recog-
nition model. According to our pragmatist interpreta-
tion, the organism embodies the recognition density
and entails the generative model as a control system.
We then formulate a direct critique of the claim that
generative models are structural representations. We
claim that to examine the role of generative models
under the FEP makes it clear that they are necessarily
distinct from the structures that encode or embody
information about structural resemblance (i.e., the
internal states). Simply put, on the assumption that
proponents of structural representations are correct to
claim that there are indeed physical structures that have
Figure 3. The same generative model in active inference, represented as a Forney factor graph. Left panel: Expressions for the belief
updates enabling approximate Bayesian inference and action selection. In this figure, boldface denotes the expectations or sufficient
statistics of hidden states in the previous figures. The brackets that figure in the action selection panel are Iverson brackets; if the
condition in square brackets is obtained, these return the value 1, and return 0 otherwise. Right panel: Forney or normal style factor
graphs are equivalent to Bayesian networks, with some important difference. In this kind of graph, nodes (the square boxes)
correspond not to variables, as in a Bayesian network, but to factors; and edges represent unknown variables that must be inferred.
Filled squares, echoing the above, denote observable outcomes. Edges are labelled in terms of the sufficient statistics of their
marginal posteriors. Factors are labelled according to the parameters that encode the associated probability distributions. Circled
numbers denote the implicit message passing in the belief updates – as messages are passed from nodes (factors) to edges (variables).
Source: From K. J. Friston, Parr, and de Vries (2017).
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the properties of structural representations under the
FEP, they are incorrect to claim that the structures they
identify as representations are generative models.
5.1. Generative models are control systems
A generative process couples the generative model of an
organism to its environment, in a causally circular
embrace reminiscent of the perception-action cycle
(Fuster, 2004; Tishby & Polani, 2011). The generative
process is what enables the generation of observations,
enforcing the view that perception is non-trivially
dependent on action. It is these observations to which
an agent has ‘access’ to at any given time. The genera-
tive model is a statistical model of the generative pro-
cess. Crucially, however, the generative model is
distinct from the generative process (K. J. Friston,
FitzGerald, Rigoli, Schwartenbeck, & Pezzulo, 2016).
This is because the actual causes of sensory input
depend on action (i.e., on a generative process), while
action depends on inference (i.e., on a generative
model).
This means that active inference depends on priors
that inform action, while action per se affects the hid-
den causes generating sensory states (observations). In
this formal sense, the function of the generative model
is to couple the organism to its embedding environment
via the generative process, which, in turn, completes the
perception-action cycle.
Following K. J. Friston (2010), Seth (2014) and
Anderson (2017), we now argue that, under active
inference, the generative model functions as a control
system. The organism uses its generative model to oper-
ate policy selection, the effect of which is to keep the
organism within its phenotypic bounds (i.e., the organ-
ism’s phylogenetically and ontogenetically specified set
points). Living systems exist in virtue of attaining none-
quilibrium steady state (for some period of time); their
dynamics do not resolve themselves through a return to
thermal equilibrium states (i.e., death), but rather by
the restoration of the system to a set of attracting states
or set points (e.g., updates of the recognition model
embodied by the organism).
This is key to understanding active inference. Active
inference generalises approximate Bayesian inference,
since in active inference the objective is not simply to
infer the hidden states that cause observations but,
more importantly, to act in such a way that minimises
self-information or surprise (via minimising free energy)
or minimises expected surprise or uncertainty (by mini-
mising expected free energy). The reason for this is sim-
ple: active inference turns on the idea that it is action,
upon which perception depends, that ultimately mini-
mises uncertainty about the external causes of sensory
observations. Hence, action can be cast as placing an
upper bound on surprise – and expected surprise or
uncertainty.
This is an important distinction between active infer-
ence and non-pragmatist appeals to a Bayesian brain
hypothesis (e.g., predictive coding). In active inference,
the inference is about sensory samples that are gener-
ated via action. In other words, the self-evidencing sys-
tem is the author of its own sensations. This has the
remarkable consequence (which we will appeal to later)
that the generative model (in particular, prior beliefs)
does all the heavy lifting in terms of structuring
exchange with the environment. In other words, in
most instances, the generative model is more deeply
structured than the generative process describing the
environment (unless we are engaging with someone
else). This is particularly true for simple things like
movement. There is nothing ‘out there’ that corre-
sponds to the articulated movement of our hands, until
it is authored by the organism.
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On this view, active inference can be read as a new
take on the good regulator theorem proposed by Conant
and Ross Ashby (1970) (see K. J. Friston, 2010). Active
inference tells us about the relation between a control
system (the generative model, with priors over action
policies) and a system being controlled (the organism
and its adaptive behaviour, the actual actions underta-
ken in, and part of, the world). This follows from a
pragmatist reinterpretation of the good regulator theo-
rem of Conant and Ashby. According to the good regu-
lator theorem, one system can effectively control
another if and only if that system is isomorphic with
respect to the fundamental property of the system that
it regulates, that is, if and only if it is a statistical model
of the relevant properties of that system (Conant and
Ross Ashby, 1970). The generative models mirror the
structure of the generative process in order to control
the behaviour of the organism. As such, generative
models are more about the control and regulation of
action than they are about figuring out what is ‘out
there’ beyond the veil of sensory impressions, and rep-
resenting the world (Anderson, 2017; Bruineberg et al.,
2016). They enable survival, rather than tracking truth.
They model the acting organism, and are used by living
systems to modulate their behaviour.
The role of the generative model is to guide action in
a contextually sensitive manner, which signals that we
ought ‘to shift our focus from how brain mechanisms
like Bayesian predictive coding implement and main-
tain models of the world, to how such mechanisms
enable the feedback loops that maintain attunement to
the environment and support adaptive behaviour’
(Anderson, 2017, p. 8). The generative model is vicar-
iously realised – that is, brought forth or enacted – by
the organism in active inference; the dynamics that is
guided by the generative model integrates the partial
contributions of model parameters embodied across
spatial and temporal scales. The attunement of the gen-
erative model to the generative process is an indirect
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process that depends on the direct tuning of the recog-
nition density embodied by the organism.
In summary, the role of a generative model is subtle
in active inference. The generative model itself never
actually exists outside the dynamics – that is, outside
the adaptive actions and policy selection of the organ-
ism. Within the dynamics, it provides a point of refer-
ence or definition of variational free energy (or more
precisely, a definition of the gradients with respect to
internal and active states). Given that the vicarious rea-
lisation of the generative model (through a minimisa-
tion of variational free energy) can only be through
action (and changes in internal states), we can think of
the generative model as being enacted, and of the recog-
nition density as being embodied.
This speaks directly to embodied and enactive
approaches in cognitive neuroscience, and provides a
computationally tractable framework for the meta-
phors mobilised by these paradigms (e.g., Gallagher,
2017; Noe¨, 2004; Thompson, 2010; Varela et al., 1991).
The notion of entailment captures the fact that the gen-
erative model is entailed by the dynamics of a living
system under active inference (Kirchhoff, 2018;
Kirchhoff & Froese, 2017; Kirchhoff & Robertson,
2018; Ramstead, Kirchhoff, et al., 2019). This interpre-
tation of the generative and recognition models allows
us to model the dialectic between embodiment (what an
organism is) and enactment (what an organism does).
The generative model is what the organism expects, and
guides what the organism is and does. It is constituted by
expectations about the consequences of action that are
conditioned upon the adaptive preferences of the
organism. The recognition model is the embodied organ-
ism, in the sense that the physical states of the organism
parameterise (embody or encode the parameters or suf-
ficient statistics of) this density. Thus, the organism lit-
erally embodies the recognition model, and its patterns
of action and perception enact the expectations of the
generative model it entails. This interpretation allows
us to evaluate and nuance representationalist concep-
tions of generative models under the FEP.
5.2. Generative models are not structural
representations
The idea that generative models are structural represen-
tations rests on an oversimplified reading of these con-
structs, based in older Bayesian theories such as the
Helmholtz machine (Dayan et al., 1995) and non-
enactive appeals to variational Bayesian methods
(Bishop, 2006), rather than on active inference under
the FEP. In active inference, it is the recognition density
that – through active inference – synchronises dynami-
cally with the niche, and entails the generative model
(examine Figure 4 again). The recognition density is
encoded by the variables that are updated in active
inference. The generative model does not coincide with
these quantities, since it relates the quantities – the ones
with the others – in an inferential net. There is no war-
rant, mathematically, for the claim that the generative
model encodes semantic content or structural informa-
tion. The generative model does not encode anything. It
is realised by the statistical relations between states of
interest. Instead, the expectations of the organism, as
they figure under the generative model, are brought
about by the organism in a kind of self-fulfilling pro-
phecy through active inference.
Against representationalist interpretations, we
emphasise the subtle, often missed point that the gen-
erative model is entailed by the dynamics (i.e., the adap-
tive behaviour) of the organism. The generative model
manifests as a control system that uses exploitable struc-
tural similarities encoded in the internal states of the
organism. It is not itself a representation, or anything
like the vehicle of representational content. Conversely,
the recognition density can be cast as having properties
similar to those of a structural representation – in the
sense that has been explored in recent literature on
active inference and cognitive representations (e.g.,
G1adziejewski & Mi1kowski, 2017; Kiefer & Hohwy,
2018). However, this only holds given that exploitable
structural similarities are generated and maintained by
active inference.
The structures that do encode exploitable structural
similarities are the internal states of the Markov blan-
ket, which parameterise a recognition density that the
organism embodies, not the generative model. So,
representationalists about generative models in active
inference conflate quantities that should be held distinct
– at least in the active inference framework. And this is
the category error of these interpretations. Structural
representationalism is correct in its ascription to organ-
isms a set of internal (e.g., neural) structures that are
apt to encode an exploitable structural resemblance,
and which is used in the control of action.
The twist here is that this vindication of a representa-
tionalist sounding idea is accomplished by mobilising
the resources of its traditional adversary, enactivism.
Under the FEP, the organism’s internal states do indeed
garner and encode exploitable, action-guiding dynamics
about environmental states, as the representationalist
maintains. However, they are established and main-
tained through active inference, that is, through pat-
terns of adaptive action. And crucially, the generative
model is nothing like these structures. It cannot be
interpreted as representational, even in the weak sense
of the proponents of structural representations.
The philosophical implication of conflating the gen-
erative process and the recognition density, and missing
their role under the FEP, is to misunderstand the role
of these constructs in the free energy formulation. A
proper understanding of generative models under
active inference, we have argued, is that they are ‘what
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an organism (normatively) expects’ and that they guide
‘what an organism is and does’. The generative model
is therefore instantiated by expectations about how the
world should be, where the expectations are condi-
tioned on the adaptive preferences of the organism.
This means that the generative model is realised by the
embodied activity of an organism. It also suggests that
the generative model is a control system that uses
exploitable structural similarities encoded in the internal
states of the organism. If this is correct, it is an outcome
that allows us to accommodate key insights of repre-
sentationalist views of active inference, without having
to accept the claim that generative models are struc-
tural representations.
6. Concluding remarks
Although we have focused more narrowly on the active
inference formulation in this article, our target and con-
clusions ultimately speak to much wider issues: the sta-
tus of one of the most central (philosophical) concepts
in the cognitive science –representation. Crucially, we
have argued that, contrary to non-enactive, brain-
centred Bayesian schemes such as predictive coding, the
Bayesian brain and predictive processing, all of which
have been articulated as vindicating the notion of struc-
tural representation, this particular reading turns out to
be unjustified once we consider the mechanics of active
inference under the free energy principle. Specifically,
we have argued that the attempted vindication of struc-
tural representationalism in Bayesian cognitive science
rests on a mistaken interpretation of the generative
model and recognition density. Representationalists
argue that generative models encode exploitable struc-
tural information about the world. Our analysis sug-
gests that this is false. Indeed, in this article we sought
to underpin the claim that generative models do not
encode anything directly; they are rather expressed in
embodied activity, and leverage information encoded in
the recognition density (which is an approximate pos-
terior belief or ‘best guess’). Assuming our conclusion is
correct, our enactive inference proposal serves to free us
Figure 4. The action-perception cycle in active inference: A generative model and process. This figure combines the Bayesian
network in Figure 2 and the Forney factor graph of Figure 3. The Bayesian network here does not denote a generative model; rather,
it describes the generative process – the environmental process, including actions of the organism, that generated the sensory. The
two graphs can be linked to depict the action-perception cycle: the policy half-edge of Figure 2 is coupled back to the generative
process – namely, through the selection of an action that then determines state transitions. The causal processes in the world (inside
the red box) generate a sequence of outcomes, which induce message passing and belief propagation, thus informing approximate
posterior beliefs about policies. These policies determine the action to be selected, which in turn generates new outcomes, thereby
closing the action-perception cycle in a circular causal embrace. The action that is selected by the process is the most probable one,
given posterior beliefs about action sequences (aka policies). In this combined figure, we emphasise the circular causality of active
inference by replacing the message labels with arrows.
Source: From K. J. Friston, Parr, and de Vries (2017).
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from a standard, but flawed, philosophical assumption
about the nature and explanatory basis of cognition
and adaptive behaviour.
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Notes
1. In this article, we will use recognition density to mean an
approximate posterior density or variational density that
corresponds to a Bayesian or posterior belief– in the sense
of (non-propositional) belief updating or belief propaga-
tion. Furthermore, we will read model as implicitly prob-
abilistic – so that the recognition model becomes a
recognition density.
2. Of note is that these beliefs do not (necessarily) pertain to
propositional or subjective beliefs (Kirchhoff &
Robertson, 2018). They are statistical constructs that bias
action and perception, rather than beliefs in the philoso-
phical sense, that is, of propositions with satisfaction or
truth conditions. Technically, beliefs are used in the sense
of Bayesian belief updating or belief propagation and
refer to probability distributions whose parameters or
sufficient statistics are associated with physical states.
3. Expected free energy is the same as variational free
energy except that the expectation is taken under the pos-
terior predictive density over future states and outcomes.
Crucially, expected free energy is conditioned on a partic-
ular sequence of actions or a policy. This means, for every
policy there is an expected free energy, enabling the selec-
tion of policies that minimise expected free energy or,
more colloquially, uncertainty. Expected free energy is
denoted by G in the legends for Figures 2 and 3.
4. Technically, the dynamics are a stochastic gradient flow
on variational free energy that is a functional (i.e., a func-
tion of a function) of the generative model. This means, a
sufficient description of any self-organising system is
available in terms of free energy gradients that may, or
may not, be expressed in terms of an explicit generative
model.
5. See Kirchhoff and Kiverstein (2019, chapters 5 and 6)
and Veissie`re, Constant, Ramstead, Friston, and
Kirmayer (2019) for an account of how cultural practices
can play a distinct role in organising the manner in which
exchanges with the environment are structured, and con-
sequently result in embodied action, including perceptual
experiences.
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